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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

23 March 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, OPEI/IC

FROM

: Richard Lehman

Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT

: NIO Contribution to the PRM-11 Task 2 Draft

Attached are some specific words for you to use in section III, A 1. and 2., B, and C 2.b. You also invited us to make some comments about actual problems encountered based on these factual descriptions we have provided. Three items stand out in particular.

- 1. The line between current and estimative intelligence has always been hard to draw. But the nature of current intelligence has made it necessary to divide the responsibility for producing current and estimative intelligence. There has always been a problem in making sure that the two are consistent. This problem has been further complicated by the necessity of making an intelligence contribution to Presidential Review Memoranda which partake of the nature of both current and estimative intelligence.
 - 2. Another serious problem concerns warning and crisis management. Because all the agencies and departments of the Community gear themselves up for crises, they produce a welter of conflicting, overlapping,

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or irrelevent information that reaches the policymaker at a time when he needs only the clearest and most cogent intelligence support. The Intelligence Community, under the guidance of the DCI, is attempting to revamp and streamline its crisis management procedures. The role of the DCI in wartime must first be specified. When that decision is made, crisis management -- from "small c crises" through "large C crises" to war can be structured more systematically.

3. We are also faced with what I have called the crosswise problem. The flexibility of the NIOs to cut across organizational lines is essential but it also tends to put the NIOs crosswise with the producers' normal chains of command. This is a problem for us especially in our relationships with CIA's DDI. We face a dilemma; the more closely the NIOs are integrated with the DDI the more efficient they are and the less ecumenical they are perceived to be by the Intelligence Community.

Richard Lehman

As stated

PTaylor:am (24 Mar 77)

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1 - D/DCI/NI Chrono

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NIO CONTRIBUTION TO THE PRM-11 TASK 2 DRAFT

- III. Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities of the DCI
 - A. The DCI as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisor.
 - 1. Advisor on Policy. The role of intelligence does not include participation in the formulation of US foreign policy. Intelligence advises, warns, estimates, reports, and implements some aspects of foreign policy when so directed. The DCI does not propose, defend, or recommend foreign policy options. He does, however, develop and advocate US Government policy with respect to intelligence resources, activities, and production.
 - 2. Spokesman on Substance. Under provisions of Executive Order 11905, the DCI is charged with acting as the President's primary advisor on foreign intelligence and with providing him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates. The DCI attends meetings of the NSC and its subcommittees to provide warning of impending events that could affect US interests abroad, briefings on current developments abroad, and estimates of the most likely future course of such developments. When requested by NSC members he also provides the Intelligence Community's estimates of probable foreign reactions to specified US foreign policy options. The DCI provides facts on such matters as SALT and SALT verification to aid NSC onsideration of these issues.
 - B. The DCI as Producer of National Intelligence
 - What is national intelligence? For many years national intelligence was defined as that intelligence which was coordinated and agreed upon by the members of the Intelligence Community

and which transcended the exclusive interest of any single agency or department. A new NSCID (#3) has been approved by the DCI and sent to the NSC for approval and promulgation. It would alter the former definition as follows: National intelligence is that intelligence required by the President, the National Security Council, and other officials of the US Government involved in formulating and directing the implementation of national security policy. The DCI has the authority to produce and disseminate national intelligence. This change recognizes that not all national intelligence can, or indeed even should, be coordinated. The true test instead is the use to which it is put -- that is, serving the President, the NSC, and other foreign policymakers.

There are three other hallmarks of national intelligence.

- -- It must be collated from <u>all</u> information known or available to any components of the US Government bearing on the matter or question at issue.
- -- It must be the result of the best analysis that all concerned components of the government are capable of providing.
- -- It must identify and reflect in its expression -- whether by written document, oral briefing, or graphic display -- any significant differences of judgmental opinion which exist among knowledgeable and responsible components of the government concerned with the matter.

National intelligence has two principal missions:

- To provide authoritative information and judgments about foreign developments to national foreign policymakers to serve as a basis for formulating and implementing national policy.
- To warn policymakers of impending developments or situations abroad that could affect US national security.

2. NIEs and the national estimates process. National Intelligence Estimates are both the end and the beginning of the national intelligence cycle. They are the end because they are the summation of all of the Community's work in the estimates and assessments that underpin national policymaking at the NSC level. They are the beginning because after each Estimate is completed, it is reviewed to identify the most critical gaps and weaknesses in our information.

There are wide variations in the way NIEs are handled. All NIEs are produced for the DCI under the aegis and supervision of the NIOs. Some Estimates are done in response to a request from a policymaker for an assessment (either short or long range) of the prospects for a given country, area, or subject. Some major Estimates are done on an annual basis, such as those on the Middle East Arms Balance or Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict. In each case, however, the same general process is followed: Terms of Reference are drafted and agreed upon by the concerned members of the Intelligence Community and often by appropriate policymakers as well; drafting assignments are given to various Community members; the NIO assembles and coordinates the draft, or arranges for another appropriate chairman to do so; the NIO or chairman ensures that dissents are noted when appropriate; the National Foreign Intelligence Board reviews the draft and advises the DCI on the Estimate; the DCI issues the Estimate, clearly pointing up significant differences of view among Community members. In the case of the major annual Estimates, the process continues throughout the year. As each Estimate is issued, it is reviewed by the Community, gaps in intelligence information or analysis are identified, and work immediately begins on specific projects and papers intended to complement the new Estimate.

The Community expresses its estimative judgments in many forms other than formal NIEs. Special NIEs (SNIEs) are produced in response to unexpected needs of policymakers and usually done with short deadlines.

Interagency Intelligence Memoranda are produced under the NIOs' supervision to deal with subjects of interest to policymakers which do not normally require NFIB consideration. Interagency Alert Memoranda are produced by the Community under the leadership of the NIOs to provide the DCI with a means of flagging a particular development or situation for the immediate attention of policymakers.

3. National Current Intelligence. Current intelligence at the national level is a production responsibility of the CIA. National current intelligence is expected to meet the same criteria previously outlined for national intelligence in general. The function of national current intelligence is to maintain a running account of events abroad to provide policymakers with an accurate account of what is actually happening, why it is happening, who the participants are, and what is most likely to happen next.

At the present time, CIA produces two national current intelligence documents, the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Daily. The PDB contains information of any degree of sensitivity deemed important by the DCI for the President to see. The circulation of the PDB is proscribed by the President and goes only to him, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The NID has a somewhat larger circulation to concerned policymakers generally at the Assistant Secretary level or above. Most subjects covered in the PDB are also covered in the NID except for items from particularly sensitive intelligence sources. Current intelligence items are normally circulated to concerned Community members for concurrence or dissent. Dissents are clearly labeled so that the reader can judge differences of view within the Community. When Community coordination cannot be achieved because of time constraints, the items are labeled to show which members of the Community have concurred.

4. Warning and Crisis-Related Intelligence. The DCI is responsible for providing advance warning of any impending attack by a foreign power upon the United States or US forces abroad or US allies. He must also provide warning of the fact that a foreign power is planning -- or even contemplating -- such an attack. The DCI is also responsible for providing intelligence support, both operational and substantive, to national policymakers during times of crisis.

The crucial question of the DCI's role during wartime has never been resolved. The DCI is charged with using all of the nation's intelligence assets to provide warning and crisis support; the control of these assets during wartime -- or in the period immediately preceding a war -- is vital to national security, and the responsibility for their control should be clearly specified.

The DCI at present has a Special Assistant for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff manned jointly by the CIA and the DIA. In times of crisis, the Operations Centers of all the involved Community components are in constant contact. The DCI designates an executive agent in any crisis which is responsible for preparing National Intelligence Situation Reports for the President and the NSC. The DCI attends NSC meetings during a crisis to provide substantive briefings and operational information when appropriate. He is supported by the NIO and by CIA's Operations Directorate. Each Agency and Department of the Intelligence Community may also prepare situation reports or other information for the national policymakers and for their departmental chiefs, but is discouraged from sending them to the White House.

- C. The DCI as Head of the Intelligence Community
 - 1.
 - 2. Community mechanisms

a.

The NIOs. The National Intelligence Officers, within their respective geographic or functional areas of responsibility, serve as the DCI's principal staff officer, advisor, and substantive representative. Each NIO is charged with viewing the problems of his or her area and the entire range of US intelligence activities and resources related to it as the DCI would view them if he could devote full time to that area. The NIOs, however, have no direct command authority over anyone. They advise the DCI and give advice and suggestions to other Intelligence Community components. The number and responsibilities of the NIOs can be altered by the DCI to provide him with flexibility in responding to the national leadership's needs.

On the DCI's behalf, the NIOs are responsible for maintaining continuing contact with the policy-level consumers of national intelligence to be sure their intelligence support needs are known and met. The NIOs are also responsible for maintaining continual contact with collectors and producers throughout the Intelligence Community as well as with knowledgeable specialists outside the Government. They ensure that the full range of our national capabilities is brought to bear on foreign intelligence questions of major importance to our national leaders.

The NIOs are responsible to the DCI for the production of NIEs, Special NIEs, Interagency Intelligence Memoranda, Alert Memoranda, and various other national assessments. Working with and through the Community, the NIOs also prepare certain DCI planning and guidance documents, such as the annual list of Key Intelligence Questions and strategies for these questions as well as assisting the DCI in preparing his annual "Perspectives for Intelligence."